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        Japan already has the oldest population in the world. It has built a generous 
social security pension program. In 2001 the income statement of this program 
moved into deficit and its balance sheet has continued to suffer from huge 
excess liabilities. This has been accompanied by a growing distrust of the 
government’s commitment on public pensions and increased concern with the 
incentive-compatibility  problem. The 2004 reforms went some way towards 
addressing these issues. 
    This paper uses a balance sheet approach to describe the current financial 
performance of social security pensions in Japan, and analyses the impact of the 
recent reform measures. 
        The balance sheet approach was first used about 700 years ago in Italy and 
since then has become one of the two major accounting tools. However, it has 
been underutilized for public policy analyses.   
    Benefits of the balance sheet approach include: first, that it describes the 
current financial status in stock terms by presenting assets and liabilities with 
their compositions; second, it implies how smoothly future financing will be 
carried out; and third, it makes clear the impacts of alternative policy measures 
on future financing.   
 
        The paper begins with a brief sketch of the Japanese social security pension 
program and summarizes Japan’s major pension problems. It then explains the  2
2004 pension reforms and uses the balance sheet approach to analyse the 
implications for the Japanese economy. The paper concludes with a discussion 
of future policy options. 
 
2  Japanese  pension  provisions before the 2004 reforms 
 
 
      Since 1980, Japan has undertaken piecemeal pension reforms every 5 years, 
mainly due to great stresses caused by anticipated demographic and economic 
factors. This has resulted in a step by step reduction in the generous pension 
benefits, an increase of the normal pensionable age from 60 to 65, and an 
increase in the pension contribution rate. Yet, in 2004, the pension provisions still 
remained generous and the system seemed likely to face serious financial 
difficulties in the future.   
   Japan currently has a two-tier benefit system. All sectors of the population 
receive the first-tier, flat-rate basic benefit. The second-tier earnings-related 
benefit applies only to employees.
1 The system operates largely like a 
pay-as-you-go defined benefit program.   
      The flat-rate basic pension covers all residents aged 20 to 60. The full old-age 
pension is payable after 40 years of contributions, provided the contributions 
were made before 60 years of age. The maximum monthly pension of 66,200 yen 
(in 2004 prices) per person is payable from age 65.
2 This benefit is indexed 
annually to reflect changes in the consumer price index (CPI). The pension may 
be claimed at any age between 60 and 70 years and is subject to actuarial 
reduction if claimed before age 65, or actuarial increase if claimed after 65 years. 
   Earnings-related benefits are  given to all employees. The accrual rate for the 
earnings-related component of old-age benefits is 0.5481 per cent per year; 40 
years’ contributions will thus earn 28.5 per cent of career average monthly real 
earnings.
3 
    The career-average monthly earnings are calculated over the employee’s 
entire period of coverage, adjusted by a net-wage index factor, and converted to 
the current earnings level. The full earnings-related pension is normally payable 
                                                  
1 A detailed explanation of the Japanese social security pension system is given by 
Takayama (1998, 2003b). 
2  1,000 yen = US$9.46 = Euro7.41=UKˊ5.10 as at 9 February 2005. 
3  A semi-annual bonus equivalent to 3.6 months salary is typically assumed.    3
from age 65 to an employee who is fully retired.
4 An earnings test is applied to 
those who are not fully retired. The current replacement rate (including basic 
benefits) for take-home pay or net income is about 60 per cent for a typical male 
retiree (with an average salary earned during 40 years of coverage) and his 
dependent wife. This translates to a monthly benefit of about 233,000 yen in 
2004.  
   Equal percentage contributions are required from employees and their 
employers.  The contributions are based on annual standard earnings including 
bonuses. Before the 2004 reforms, the total contribution rate for the principal 
program for private-sector employees (Kosei-Nenkin-Hoken, KNH), was 13.58 
per cent. Non-employed persons between the ages of 20 to 60 years paid 
flat-rate individual contributions. The current rate since April 1998 is 13,300 yen 
per month. And those who cannot pay for financial reasons are exempt.The 
flat-rate basic benefits for the period of exemption will be one-third of the normal 
amount. 
As well, if the husband has the pension contribution for social security 
deducted from his salary, his dependent wife is automatically entitled to the 
flat-rate basic benefits, and she is not required to make any individual payments 
to the public pension system. 
   The government subsidizes one-third of the total cost of the flat-rate basic 
benefits plus administrative expenses. There is however no subsidy for the 
earnings-related part. All social security pension contributions are tax-deductible, 
while the overwhelming parts of their benefits are virtually tax-exempt.   
    For 2004 the aggregate amount of social security pension benefits is 
estimated at around 46 trillion yen, or about 9 percent of GDP.
5  
 
3    Demography and its impact on financing social security   
 
In January 2002, the Japanese National Institute of Population and Social 
Security Research (NIPSSR) released its latest population projections. These 
indicate that the total population will peak at 128 million in    2006 and then begin 
to fall steadily, decreasing to about 50 per cent of the current number by 2100. 
    The total fertility rate (TFR) was 1.29 in 2003 and there is little sign that it will 
                                                  
4  The normal pensionable age of the KNH is 65, though Japan has special arrangements 
for a transition period between 2000 and 2025. See Takayama (2003b) for more details.   
5  Almost all Japanese employees receive occupational pensions and/or lump-sum 
retirement benefits, as well. See Takayama (2003b) for more information.  4
stabilize or return to a higher level. Yet, the 2002 medium variant projections 
assume that it will record the historical low of 1.31 in 2006 and will gradually rise 
to 1.39 around 2050, progressing slowly to 2.07 by 2150. The number of births in 
2003 wasabout 1.12 million and will continue to decrease to less than 1.0 million 
by 2014, falling further to 0.67 million in 2050.   
  Because it has the world’s longest life expectancy, Japan is now experiencing 
a very rapid aging of its population. The number of the elderly (65 years and 
above) was 24.9 million in 2004. This will increase sharply to reach 34 million by 
2018, remaining around 34-36 million thereafter until around 2060. Consequently 
the proportion of the elderly (65 years and above) will go up very rapidly from 
19.5 per cent in 2004 to 25.3 per cent by 2014, rising further to more than 30 per 
cent by 2033. Japan already has one of the oldest populations in the world. 
    In Japan, nearly 70 per cent of social security benefits are currently 
distributed to the elderly. Along with the ailing domestic economy, the rapid 
population aging will certainly put increased stresses on the financing of social 
security.  
In May 2004 the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare published the latest 
estimates of the cost of social security, using the 2002 population projections of 
the NIPSSR. According to these estimates, the aggregate cost of social security 
was 17.2 per cent of GDP in 2004. This is expected to steadily increase to 24.3 
per cent by 2025, if the current provisions for benefits remain unchanged.   
Of the various social security costs, that of pensions is predominant, 
amounting to 9.2 per cent of GDP in 2004, with a further expected increase to 
11.6 per cent by 2025. The cost for health care is 5.2 per cent in 2004, but is 
projected to rapidly rise to 8.1 per cent by 2025.   
The Japanese economy is still reeling from the effects of the burst in the asset 
price bubble and the subsequent sharp downturn in economic activity. The 
expected decline in its population will soon be reflected in a sharp reduction in 
young labor, in a falling savings rate and in a decrease in capital formation, all of 
which will contribute to a further shrinking of the country’s economy.   
 
4    Some basic facts on pensions 
 
    Any pension reform proposal must take into account the current basic facts 
on social security pensions. Of these, the following five are especially crucial. 
  5
 
A persistent deficit in the income statement 
    Since 2001, the pension scheme for private sector employees (KNH) has 
been facing an income statement deficit. It recorded a deficit of 700 billion yen in 
2001, increasing to 4.2 trillion yen in 2002.  It is estimated that this deficit will 
persist for a long time, unless radical remedies are made in the KNH financing.   
 
Huge excess liabilities in the balance sheet 
      The KNH balance sheet is shown in Figure 1. In calculating the balance sheet,   
it was assumed that: the annual increases in wages and the CPI were 2.1 
percent and 1.0 percent respectively, nominal, while the discount rate is 3.2 
percent annually; and the current contribution rate of the KNH of 13.58 
percentage points, would remain unchanged over the projection period (to the 
year 2100).   
 
    Figure 1 indicates that as at the end of March 2005, excess liabilities of the 
KNH are estimated at 550 trillion yen, which is a quarter of the total liabilities.
6  
 
(Figure 1 about here) 
 
The balance sheet set out in Figure 1 has two parts. Part one illustrates the 
assets and liabilities accrued from past contributions, while part two refers to 
assets and liabilities accrued from future contributions. It can be seen that as far 
as part two is concerned, any excess liabilities are almost eliminated. That is, the 
funding sources of the current provisions will be sufficient to finance future 
benefits. Here the only task left is to slim down future benefits by 4.5 percent.   
        But if we look at part one of the balance sheet, things appear quite different. 
The remaining pension liabilities are estimated to be 800 trillion yen, while 
pension assets are only 300 trillion yen (comprising a funded reserve of 170 
trillion yen plus transfers from general revenue of 130 trillion yen). The difference 
is quite large, about 500 trillion yen,
7 which accounts for most of the excess 
                                                  
6    Excess liabilities of all social security pension programs in Japan as at the end of 
March 2005 amounted to around 650 trillion yen, which is equivalent to 1.3 times the 
year 2004 GDP of Japan. 
7  The amount of excess liabilities (EL) will vary depending on alternative discount rates. 
For example, a 2.1 per cent discount rate induces EL of 650 trillion yen, while another 
4.0 per cent discount rate produces EL of 420 trillion yen. Part One excess liabilities can  6
liabilities in the KNH and is equivalent to about 100 percent of GDP of Japan in 
2004.  
In the past, too many pension promises were made, while sufficient funding 
sources had not been arranged. As a result, the Japanese have enjoyed a long 
history of generous social security pensions. However, contributions made in the 
past were relatively small, resulting in a fairly small funded reserve. 
Consequently, the focus of the true crisis in Japanese social security pensions is 
how to handle the excess liabilities of 500 trillion yen representing entitlements 
from contributions made in the past.   
 
The heavy burden of pension contributions 
    In Japanese public policy debates, one of the principal issues has been how to 
cut down personal and corporate income tax. But recently the situation has  
changed drastically. Social security contributions (for pensions, health care, 
unemployment, work injury and long-term care) were 55.6 trillion yen (11.2 
percent of GDP) for FY2003, more than all tax revenues (43.9 trillion yen) of the 
central government for the same year. Since 1998, the central government has 
received more revenue from social security contributions than from tax on 
incomes; FY2003 revenue from personal income tax was 13.8 trillion yen and 
from corporate income tax 9.1 trillion yen, while revenue from social security 
pension contributions stood at 29.0 trillion yen. As a result many Japanese now 
feel that the burden of social security pension contributions is far too heavy and 
employers have begun to express serious concerns about any further increases 
in social security contributions.   
 
Overshooting the income transfer between generations 
Recent data shows the amazing fact that currently in Japan the elderly are 
better-off than those aged 30 to 44 in terms of per-capita income after 
redistribution (see Figure 2). This suggests that current pension benefits may be 
too generous and there is still room for reduction in benefits provided to the 
current retired population (which would address the excess liabilities indicated by 
the balance sheet).   
 
(Figure 2 about here) 
                                                                                                                                                   
be termed as “accrued-to-date net liabilities” or “net termination liabilities”. See Franco 
(1995) and Holzmann et al. (2004).      7
 
An increasing drop-out rate 
        In the past 20 years, the Japanese government has made repeated changes 
to the pension program, increasing social security pension contributions and 
reducing benefits through raising the normal pensionable age while reducing the 
accrual rate. Similar piece-meal reforms are likely continue into the future. 
Many Japanese feel that the government is breaking its promise.  As 
distrust of the government’s pension commitment builds up, non-participation   
is growing.   
In 2002 nearly 50 percent of non-salaried workers and persons with no 
occupations dropped out from the basic level of old-age income protection, owing 
to exemption or failure to pay    contributions (see Figure 3).     
 
(Figure 3 about here) 
 
Also, employers are trying to find ways of avoiding to pay social security 
pension contributions. Indeed, the aggregate amount of the KNH contributions 
has been decreasing since 1998, in spite of no change in the contribution rate.
8  
Any further escalation in the social security contribution rate will surely 
induce a higher drop-out rate.
9 
 
5    The 2004 pension reforms: main features and remaining difficulties
10 
     
   The administration of Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichirō submitted a set of 
pension reform bills to the National Diet on February 10, 2004. These were 
enacted on June 5. This section will describe the gist of the approved reforms 
and explore issues that remain to be addressed.   
 
Increases in contributions 
                                                  
8  Part of the lower contributions were also due to reduced contributors under population ageing, 
however. 
9  Contributions to social security pensions operate as “penalties on employment.” Further hikes in 
the contribution rate will bitterly damage domestic companies which have been facing the 
mega-competition on a global scale, thereby exerting negative effects on the economy, inducing a 
higher unemployment rate, lower economic growth, lower saving rates and so on. Further increases 
in the contribution rate will be sure to decrease take-home pay of actively working people in real 
terms, producing lower consumption and lower effective demand. 
10  This section draws heavily on Takayama (2004).  8
    Salaried workers are, as a rule, enrolled in the KNH, which is part of the public 
pension system. Contributions under this plan had since October 1996 been set 
at 13.58 per cent of annual income, paid half by the worker and half by the 
employer. The newly enacted reforms raised this rate by 0.354 percentage points 
in October 2004. The rate will rise every September thereafter by the same 
amount until 2017, after which it will remain fixed at 18.30 per cent of annual 
income. The portion paid by workers will accordingly rise from the current 6.79 
per cent of annual income to 9.15 per cent.   
  For an “average” male company employee earning 360,000 yen a month plus 
an annual bonus equivalent to 3.6 months’ pay, total contributions will increase 
by nearly 20,000 yen a year starting from October 2004, and by the time they 
stop rising in September 2017, they will have reached just under 1.03 million yen 
a year (of which the share paid by the worker will be just over 514,000 yen or 35 
per cent more than the current level of contributions).   
  Those who are not enrolled in the KNH or other public pension schemes for 
civil servants are required to participate in the National Pension plan, which 
provides the so-called basic pension only (the basic pension also forms the first 
tier of benefits under the KNH and other public pension systems for civil 
servants). Contributions under this plan will rise by 280 yen each April from the 
current 13,300 yen per month until they plateau at 16,900 yen (at 2004 prices) in 
April 2017. The actual rise in National Pension contributions will be adjusted 
according to increases in general wage levels.   
  In addition, the government will increase its subsidies for the basic pension. 
Currently one-third of the cost of basic pension benefits is paid from the national 
treasury; this share is to be raised in stages until it reaches one-half in 2009.   
 
Reductions in benefits   
  Benefits under the KNH consist of two tires; the flat-rate basic pension, which 
is paid to all public pension plan participants, and a separate earnings-related 
component. The latter is calculated on the basis of the worker’s average 
preretirement income, converted to current values. Until now, the index used to 
convert past income to current values was the rate of increase in take-home pay. 
Under the recently enacted reforms, however, this index will be subject to a 
negative adjustment over a transition  period based on changes in two 
demographic factors - the decline in the number of participants and the increase 
in life expectancy. This period of adjustment is expected to last through to 2023.    9
    The application of the first demographic factor means that benefit levels will be 
cut to reflect the fact that fewer people are supporting the pension system. The 
actual number of people enrolled in all public pension schemes will be 
ascertained each year, and the rate of decline will be calculated based on this 
figure. The average annual decline is projected to be around 0.6 points.     
The second demographic factor will adjust for the fact that people are living 
longer and thus collecting their pensions for more years; the aim is to slow the 
pace of increase in the total amount of benefits paid as a result of increased 
longevity. This factor will not be calculated by tracking future movements in life 
expectancy; instead, it has been set at an annual rate of about 0.3 percentage 
points on the basis of current demographic projections for the period through 
2025. Together, the two demographic factors are thus expected to lead to a 
negative adjustment of about 0.9 points a year during the period in question.   
  How will these changes affect people’s actual retirement benefits? Let us 
consider the case of a pair of “typical” KNH beneficiaries as defined by the 
Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare: a 65-year-old man who earned the 
average wage throughout his 40-year career and his 65-year-old wife who was a 
full-time homemaker for 40 years from her twentieth birthday. In FY 2004, this 
typical couple would receive 233,000 yen a month.   
    How does this amount compare to what employees are currently taking home? 
The average monthly income of a salaried worker in 2004 was around 360,000 
yen, before taxes and social insurance deductions. Assuming that this is 
supplemented by bonuses totaling an equivalent of 3.6 months’ pay, the average 
annual income is roughly 5.6 million yen. Deducting 16 per cent of this figure for 
taxes and social insurance payments leaves a figure for annual take-home pay of 
about 4.7 million yen, or 393,000 yen a month.   
    The 233,000 yen provided to the typical pensioners is 59.3 per cent of 393,000 
yen. However, under the 2004 reforms this percentage, or replacement rate, will 
gradually decline to an estimated figure of 50.2 per cent by FY 2023 (assuming 
that consumer prices and nominal wages rise according to government 
projections by 1.0 per cent and 2.1 per cent a year, respectively). Over the next 
two decades, then, benefit levels are projected to decline by roughly 15 per cent 
by comparison with wage levels.   
  The revised pension legislation stipulates that the income replacement rate is 
not to fall below 50 per cent for the typical case described above, so the transition 
period of negative adjustment will come to an end once the replacement rate  10
declines to 50 per cent. This provision was included to alleviate fears that 
retirement benefits would continue to shrink without limit.   
  How will the reforms affect those who are already receiving their pensions? 
Until now, benefits for those 65 years old and over were adjusted for fluctuations 
in the consumer price index. This ensured that pensioners’ real purchasing 
power remained unchanged and helped ease postretirement worries. But this 
cost-of-living link will effectively be severed during the transition period, since the 
application of the demographic factors will pull down real benefits by around 0.9 
points a year. In principle, however, nominal benefits are not to be cut unless 
there has also been a drop in consumer prices. Once the transition period is over, 
the link to the consumer price index is to be restored.   
 
Changes to provisions for working seniors and divorcees   
  People aged 60-64 who are receiving pensions and also have wage income 
have up to now had their benefits reduced by a flat 20 per cent, regardless of 
how much or little they earn. This rule was abolished in the 2004 reforms so as 
not to discourage older people from working. However these older workers will 
still be subject to the current rule that if the sum of wages and pension benefits 
exceeds 280,000 yen a month (after factoring in annual bonuses), the pension 
benefits are to be cut by 50 per cent of the amount in excess of this level.   
    Workers aged 70 and over, meanwhile, have been exempt from paying into the 
KNH, even if they are still on a company’s payroll. And they have not had their 
benefits reduced no matter how much they earn. Beginning in April 2007, 
however, their benefits will be reduced if they are high-income earners. Those 
receiving more than an equivalent of 480,000 yen a month in wages and pension 
benefits will have their benefits cut by 50 per cent of the amount in excess of this 
level. This is a rule that currently applies to those aged 65 to 69, and it will be 
maintained for this age group. The over-70s group will still be entitled to the full 
amount of the basic pension, and they will continue to be exempt from paying 
contributions.  
Currently divorced wives are not legally entitled to any portion of their former 
husbands’ earnings-related pension benefits, but this will change under the 2004 
reforms. Couples who divorce after April 2007 will be able to split the rights to the 
earnings-related portion of the husband’s pension that accrued during their 
marriage. The wife will be able to receive a share of up to 50 per cent of these 
rights with the actual share to be determined by agreement between the two. For  11
rights accruing after April 2008, moreover, a full-time homemaker will be able to 
automatically receive half of her husband’s benefits in case of divorce by filing a 
claim at a social insurance office. Underlying this rule is the assumption that even 
though the contributions are paid in the husband’s name, the wife has provided 
half of the couple’s livelihood through her work as a homemaker.
11  
 
Improved survivors’ benefits and child-raising concessions 
Until now widowed spouses younger than 30 and without children under the 
age of 18 have been entitled to lifelong benefits under the survivor’s pension 
scheme (based on the earnings of the deceased spouse). After April 2007, 
however, they will receive benefits for no longer than five years.   
    Workers taking child-care leave are exempt from making pension contributions, 
and to prevent a decrease in their future benefits due to this period of 
nonpayment, they are treated as having continued their full payments, even 
when they have no income. This special exemption can now be claimed for up to 
one year after childbirth, but starting in April 2005 the period will be extended 
until the child reaches age three.   
    Also from April 2005, parents who change their working arrangements to put in 
shorter hours so as to care for children under age three and who take a 
corresponding cut in pay will be treated as having worked full time and earned a 
full salary. Actual contributions during this three-year period, though, will be 
based on the lower earnings.   
 
Other public and private pension reforms 
  As a rule, a person cannot simultaneously receive more than one public 
pension. But the recent reforms have created an exception. People with 
disabilities who had gainful employment and paid pension contributions will, from 
April 2006, be entitled to not only their basic disability pension but also the 
earnings-related component of the old-age pension or survivor’s pension. This 
measure is designed to encourage greater employment among these people.   
  Participants in the National Pension plan who have low incomes currently pay 
either half of the regular contributions or none at all. There will be a finer tuning of 
payment exemptions starting in July 2006, when low-income earners may also 
be exempt from paying one-quarter or three-quarters of the regular contributions.   
                                                  
11 T he provisions for working husbands and dependent homemaker wives apply conversely in 
cases where a home-maker husband is dependent on the wife.  12
As well, the administrative processes will be improved and streamlined.  Under 
the current setup, pension plan participants can find out how much they will 
receive in benefits only by going to a social insurance office with their pension 
pass-books after they have reached age 55. From April 2008, however, such 
information will be disclosed to all contributors each year, along with their 
payment records.   
  The reforms cover private pension plans as well. From October 2004, the 
upper limit of the amount that can be put aside each month under 
company-funded defined-contribution pension plans was raised from 36,000 yen 
to 46,000 yen in cases where there is no other corporate pension plan and from 
18,000 yen to 23,000 yen where there is another plan in effect. The ceiling on 
monthly installments under individually funded defined-contribution plans for 
salaried workers was raised from 15,000 yen to 18,000 yen where there is no 
corporate pension coverage, while the cap for the self-employed remained 
unchanged at 68,000 yen. The higher ceilings for private plans are designed to 
make up for the anticipated smaller benefits of public old-age schemes.   
 
Are the 2004 reforms incentive-compatible? 
  Social insurance contributions in Japan already exceed the amount collected 
in national taxes, and contributions to the pension system are by far the biggest 
social insurance item. If this already huge sum is increased by more than 1 trillion 
yen a year, as the government plans, both individuals and companies are very 
likely to change their behavior. Government projections of revenues and 
expenditures, though, completely ignore the prospect of such change.   
It is possible that companies will reconsider their hiring plans and wage scales 
to avoid the higher social insurance burden. They may cut back on recruitment of 
new graduates and become more selective about midcareer hiring as well. Many 
young people will be stripped of employment opportunities and driven out of the 
labor market, instead of being enlisted to support the pension system with a 
percentage of their income. As well, the employment options for middle-aged 
women who wish to reenter the work force will be reduced and as only a few 
older workers will be able to continue commanding high wages; there is likely to 
be a dramatic rise in the number of aging workers who will be forced to choose 
between remaining on the payroll with a cut in pay or settling for retirement. It is 
possible that many more companies will either choose or be forced to leave the 
KNH, causing the number of subscribers to fall far below the government’s  13
projections and pushing the system closer to bankruptcy.   
If these event come to fruition, the jobless rate on the whole could rise. The 
Japan Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry has estimated that higher 
pension contributions could lead to the loss of 1 million jobs and boost the 
unemployment rate by 1.3 percentage points.   
The government plan to increase pension contributions annually for the next 
13 years will therefore exert ongoing deflationary pressure on the Japanese 
economy. For the worker, a rise in contribution levels means less take-home pay; 
as a result, consumer spending is likely to fall, and this will surely hinder 
prospects for a self-sustaining recovery and return to steady growth.   
  Another  problem  with  increasing pension contributions is that they are 
regressive, since there is a ceiling for the earnings on which payment 
calculations are based and unearned income is not included in the calculations at 
all.  
One major objective of the 2004 reforms is to eventually eliminate the huge 
excess liabilities in the balance sheet of the KNH. The plan is to generate a 
surplus by (1) increasing contributions, (2) increasing payments from the national 
treasury, and (3) reducing benefits. The policy measures adopted in the 2004 
pension reform bill will induce huge excess assets of 420 trillion yen in part two  
of the balance sheet while offsetting excess liabilities of the same amount in part 
one, as shown in Figure 4. Huge excess assets of part two of the balance sheet 
imply that future generations will be forced to pay more in contributions than the 
anticipated benefits they will receive. That is, it is estimated that in aggregate the 
present value of future benefits will be around 80 percent of the present value of 
future contributions.   
 
(Figure 4 about here) 
 
It is as if the Japanese government is cutting paper not with scissors but with 
a saw. Younger generations are most likely to intensify their distrust against 
Government and the incentive-compatibility issue or drop-out problem will 
intensify. The management lobby (Nippon Keidanren) and trade unions (Rengo) 
both oppose any further increases of more than 15 percentage point in the KNH 
contribution rate.   
 
A declining replacement rate  14
  As noted above, those who are already receiving their pensions will see their 
benefits decline in real terms by an average 0.9 percentage points per year. The 
government scenario sees consumer prices eventually rising 1.0 per cent a year 
and take-home pay by 2.1 per cent a year. This means that the typical 
beneficiary who begins receiving 233,000 yen a month at age 65 in 2004 will get 
roughly 240,000 yen at age 84 in 2023., in other words, nominal benefits will 
remain virtually unchanged for two decades, despite the fact that average 
take-home pay of the working population is projected to have risen by over 40 
per cent. The income replacement rate, which stood at nearly 60 per cent at age 
65, will dwindle to 43 per cent by the time the typical recipient turns 84. The 
promise of benefits in excess of 50 per cent of take-home pay does not apply, 
therefore, to those who are already on old-age pensions.   
 
Automatic balance mechanism: still incomplete 
  The so-called demographic factors are likely to continue changing for the 
foreseeable future. The government itself foresees the number of participants in 
public pension plans declining over the coming century: The estimated figure of 
69.4 million participants in 2005 is expected to fall to 61.0 million in 2025, 45.3 
million in 2050, and 29.2 million in 2100. This corresponds to an average annual 
decline of 0.6 per cent through 2025, 1.2 per cent of the quarter century from 
2025, and 0.9 per cent for the half century from 2050. In other words, the decline 
in the number of workers who are financially supporting the public pension 
system will continue for many decades.   
  The 2004 reforms, however, adjust benefit levels in line with the decline in the 
contribution paying population for the next 20 years only; the government’s 
“standard case” does not foresee any further downward revisions, even if the 
number of participants continues to fall. If the government really anticipates an 
ongoing decline in participation, there is no good reason to abruptly stop 
adjusting benefit levels after a certain period of time. Sweden and Germany, for 
instance, have adopted permanent mechanisms whereby benefit levels are 
automatically adjusted for fluctuations in demographic factors. 
    The decision to keep the typical income replacement rate at 50 per cent at the 
point when pension payments commence represents, in effect, the adoption of a 
defined benefit formula. Maintaining both fixed contributions on the one hand and 
defined benefit levels on the other is not an easy task, as there is no room to deal 
with unforeseen developments. The government will be confronted with a fiscal  15
emergency should its projections for growth in contributions and a reversal in the 
falling birthrate veer widely from the underlying assumptions.   
For example, the government has based its population figures on the January 
2002 projections of the National Institute of Population and Social Security 
Research. Under these projections, the medium variant for the total fertility rate 
(the average number of childbirths per woman) falls to 1.31 in 2007, after which it 
begins climbing, reaching 1.39 in 2050 and 1.73 in 2100. Actual figures since the 
projections were released have been slightly lower than this variant, and there 
are no signs whatsoever that the fertility rate will stop declining in 2007.   
 
The normal pensionable age 
    If the government is to keep its promise on an upper limit for contributions and 
a lower limit for benefits, the only policy option it will have in the event of a 
financial shortfall will be to raise the age at which people begin receiving benefits. 
The reform package makes no mention of such a possibility; policymakers no 
doubt chose to simply put this task off to a future date.   
 
Increasing transfers from general revenue, why? 
  By FY 2009 the share of the basic pension benefits funded by the national 
treasury will be raised from one-third to one-half. This means that more taxes will 
be used to cover the cost of benefits. Taxes are by nature different from 
contributions paid by participants in specific pension plans, and there is a need to 
reconsider the benefits that are to be funded by tax revenues.   
  The leaders of Japanese industry tend to be quite advanced in years. For the 
most part, they are over the age of 65, which means that they are qualified to 
receive the flat-rate basic pension. Even though they are among the wealthiest 
people in the country, they are entitled to the same basic pension as other older 
people hovering around the poverty line. Using tax revenues to finance a bigger 
share of the basic pension essentially means asking taxpayers to foot a bigger 
bill for the benefits of wealthy households as well. For an elderly couple, the 
tax-financed portion of the basic pension will rise from 530,000 yen a year to 
800,000 yen. If a need arises to raise taxes at a future date, who will then actually 
agree to pay more? Few people will be willing to tolerate such wasteful uses of 
tax revenue.   
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Needless to say, conclusions drawn by the balance sheet in the preceding 
section are sensitive to the major assumptions such as the discount rate, the 
accounting period, and demographic/economic conditions. This section will 
consider the robustness of the conclusions to alternative assumptions.   
Here three annual discount rates are considered; 2.1 per cent, 3.2 per cent 
and 4.0 per cent. All these are in nominal terms. For the accounting period, we 
consider four cases; 35 years, 75 years, 95 years, and infinity. The date of 
evaluation is the end of March 2005.   
Tables 1 and 2 present the result of our sensitivity analysis. Assumptions for 
demographic and other economic conditions remain unchanged.   
The Japanese Government says that with the 2004 pension reform, the 
balance sheet of the KNH has completely become healthy, with all excess 
liabilities eliminated. This conclusion does not hold, however, with alternative 
assumptions – such as a longer accounting period (of more than 95 years) or a 
lower discount rate (of less than 3.2 per cent per annum in nominal terms) into 
consideration. See Table 1. For a discount rate of 3.2 per cent, the excess 
liabilities are still positive, and increase to about 20 trillion yen if we extend the 
accounting period to infinity. This amount will be 150 trillion yen, for an assumed 
discount rate of 2.1 per cent. Thus, the “healthy” balance sheet hypothesis is 
crucially dependent on the discount rate and the accounting period.   
 
(Tables 1 and 2 about here) 
 
Table 2 compares the present values of discounted future contributions and 
pension benefits entitled by them. As we described before in this paper, the 
future pension benefits will be about 80 per cent of the future contributions. This 
gap could lead to an incentive-compatibility problem. However, with a lower 
assumed discount rate, the result can be quite different. If we assume a 2.1 per 
cent discount rate for example, the benefit/contribution ratio will increase more 
than 100 per cent within the infinite time horizon, and the pension benefits could 
be more than the contributions. Under these assumptions incentive-compatibility 
is not a problem. 
In summary, the choice of the discount rate and the accounting period is 
quite decisive in the balance sheet approach. The 95-year accounting period 
seems rather a little shorter in the Japanese context, since the “healthy” balance  17
sheet hypothesis can be misleading. When it comes to the choice of a discount 
rate, a rate of return from investment is often used. The assumption of a 3.2 per 
cent discount rate is therefore reasonable. In the FY 1999 balance sheet, the 
Japanese Government assumed an annual discount rate 4.0 per cent , which 
was equivalent to the rate of return from investment. In the FY 2004 balance 
sheet, the Japanese Government assumes two discount rates; 2.1 per cent (the 
rate of increases in wages and salaries) and 3.2 per cent (the rate of return from 
investment). However, the rationale to link the assumed discount rate to the rate 
of increase in salaries is unclear.   
 
7  Future policy options 
 
The Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare has shown a great interest in 
switching the pension system to an NDC (notional defined contribution) 
arrangement. It has indicated, however, that it does not consider such a switch to 
be realistic until the KNH contribution rate reaches its peak level in 2017. 
We believe however, that switching to an NDC arrangement could be 
introduced in Japan sooner, if we separate the “legacy pension” problem from the 
issue of re-building a sustainable pension system for the future.   
The legacy pension problem is equivalent to sunk costs in the economic 
perspective. It can be solved not by increasing the KNH contribution rate but by 
introducing a new tax – for example a 3.2 per cent earmarked consumption tax 
and intensive interjection of the increased transfers from general revenue (see 
Figure 5).
12 Needless to say, the current generous benefits have to be reduced 
more or less by the same percentage in the aggregate level as implemented in 
the 2004 pension reform bill. 
 
(Figure 5 about here) 
 
        As far as part two of the balance sheet is concerned, which relates to future 
contributions and promised pension benefits entitled by future contributions, a 
switch to the NDC is possible and preferable. The KNH contribution rate can be 
kept unchanged at the before-reform level of 13.58 percentage points. As well, 
                                                  
12  Another 2 per cent earmarked consumption tax might be all right, since the 
remaining excess liabilities of 90 trillion yen might be acceptable as a “hidden” national 
debt.  18
the notional rate of return should be endogenous, following a Swedish-type 
automatic balance mechanism. 
Importantly, with the NDC plan, the incentive-compatibility problem can be 
avoided. Indeed, every dollar counts in the NDC, and this would be the most 
important element of a switch to an NDC plan. It will be demonstrated to the 
public that everybody gets a pension equivalent to his/her own contribution 
payments.
13 
    Further, an NDC plan is expected to be rather neutral to the retirement 
decision. The labor force participation rate for a Japanese elderly male still 
remains at a considerably high level (71.2 percent in 2003 for those of age 60 to 
64) as compared with other developed countries. The shift to NDC arrangements 
can induce later retirement also in Japan, but its effect may not be so significant.   
A move to NDC may lead to lower replacement rates at age 65. However, 
this can be compensated by working longer to age 67 or so, or by more voluntary 
saving.  
    However, while not explicitly considering NDC arrangements, the Japanese 
government has signaled increased support of defined contributions 
arrangements by deciding to give more tax incentives to the existing defined 
contribution plan from October 2004 onward.   
 
8   Concluding  remarks 
 
    The Japanese are increasingly concerned with the “taste of pie” rather than 
the “size of pie” or the “distribution of pie.” When it comes to social security 
pensions, the most important question is whether or not they are worth buying. It 
has become a secondary concern how big or how fair they are. Despite the 
comprehensive 2004 reforms many issues remain. In particular, the basic design 
of the pension program should be incentive-compatible. Contributions should be 
much more directly linked with old-age pension benefits, while an element of 
social adequacy should be incorporated in a separate tier of pension benefits 
financed by other sources than contributions.   
  Traditionally  the  current (and projected future) income statement has been the 
major tool for describing the financial performance of social security pensions all 
over the world. It can only give half the story, however. Financial sustainability of 
social security pensions is not often attained even if its income statement enjoys 
                                                  
13 See  Könberg (2002), Palmer (2003) and Settergren (2001) for more details.  19
a surplus. The balance sheet approach is now an indispensable tool for people to 
understand the long run financial sustainability of social security pensions and to 
evaluate varying financial impacts of different reform alternatives. Balance sheet 
of occupational pensions is a “must” item for financial accounting of companies. 
Why not for social security pensions?   
    Balance  sheet  of  social  security pensions in Sweden, Japan, Singapore and 
US have been available for some time. It is essential that the approach be used 
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